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Maritime Law & Job Site Accidents

The law that covers a worker hurt on a Houston job site depends on where the worker was hurt and what the worker does. A crew member may sue under the Jones Act; a longshore or harbor worker is generally covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act; an offshore platform worker is reached by that Act through the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act; and a land-based worker is usually under Texas workers’ compensation.

The short version

  • Four regimes, not one. Jones Act, Longshore Act, Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and Texas workers’ compensation claims each have their own rules and deadlines.
  • The first two do not overlap. The Supreme Court calls the Jones Act and the Longshore Act “mutually exclusive compensation regimes” (Chandris v. Latsis, 1995).
  • Location matters at the water’s edge. The Longshore Act reaches injuries on navigable waters and on an adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal or similar area customarily used for loading, unloading, repairing or building a vessel (33 U.S.C. § 903(a)).
  • Texas workers’ compensation is elective for most private employers (Labor Code § 406.002), so a land-based worker may be covered by it or may have a negligence claim against a non-subscriber.
  • Deadlines are short and differ. Written notice under the Longshore Act is due in 30 days, and a claim in one year (33 U.S.C. §§ 912, 913); Texas also uses 30 days and one year (Labor Code §§ 409.001, 409.003).

Which law covers a worker hurt on a Houston job site?

It depends on a worker’s status and the site, not on the worker’s employer’s name. A seaman is covered by the Jones Act, a land-based maritime worker by the Longshore Act, an offshore-platform worker through the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and an ordinary land-based employee by Texas workers’ compensation.

The Houston area has all of these workers, and the wrong label can cost a claim its deadline. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis explains the split: the Jones Act and the Longshore Act are “mutually exclusive,” because the Longshore Act excludes “a master or member of a crew of any vessel,” and workers under neither “may still recover under an applicable state workers’ compensation scheme or, in admiralty, under general maritime tort principles.”

A deckhand and a dock worker employed by the same company can therefore have different claims, and our guide to the kinds of damages shows what a claim may seek. This article tells the regimes apart. The firm’s maritime law page and Galveston maritime page describe its maritime work.

What makes a worker a seaman under the Jones Act?

The test the U.S. Supreme Court applies has two parts: do the worker’s duties contribute to a vessel’s function or mission, and is the worker’s tie to a vessel in navigation, or to an identifiable group of vessels, substantial in both length and kind? A job on a ship is not enough by itself.

The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104(a), gives an injured seaman the choice of a jury trial against the employer, but apart from excluding certain aquaculture workers (§ 30104(b)) it does not define “seaman.” Chandris fills the gap, and it adds that seaman status “is not merely a temporal concept”: time aboard counts, and so does the nature of the work. The companion article on Jones Act claims works through the test and its rule of thumb; recreational boating belongs on our boating accidents page. Seaman status turns on the facts, so a maritime attorney should review them.

Who does the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act cover?

Workers in “maritime employment,” such as longshoremen, ship repairmen and shipbuilders, hurt on navigable waters or on an adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal or similar area customarily used for vessel work. Crew members of a vessel are excluded.

Under 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) an “employee” is “any person engaged in maritime employment,” a term that includes longshoremen and “any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker”; among the exclusions is “a master or member of a crew of any vessel.” The location test is in § 903(a): compensation is payable only if the disability or death results from an injury “occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel).”

Section 905(a) makes the employer’s duty to pay compensation its only liability to the worker, unless the employer fails to secure payment, in which case the worker may claim compensation or sue. Someone else may still be liable: under § 905(b), a covered person hurt by a vessel’s negligence may sue the vessel, whose liability “shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness.” The section carves out workers employed by the vessel for stevedoring services and certain shipbuilding, repair and breaking situations, so who is a proper defendant is fact-specific. Claims against an equipment maker are covered on our defective products page.

Illustration of a Houston Ship Channel scene with a container terminal crane, a tugboat and barge, and an industrial plant on the shore
Illustration. Vessel, dock, platform and plant jobs can sit within sight of one another and fall under different laws.

What law covers an offshore platform or rig worker?

For injuries from operations on the Outer Continental Shelf, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) makes compensation payable under the Longshore Act, and it excludes masters and crew members of vessels. Federal law applies on the platform, together with the adjacent state’s law to the extent it is not inconsistent.

Offshore work sits under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Section 1333(a)(1) extends United States law to artificial islands and to installations “permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed” for resource work, and § 1333(a)(2)(A) makes the laws of each adjacent State federal law there “to the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent” with federal law. The compensation rule is in subsection (b): for injuries “as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf” to explore for, develop, remove or pipeline natural resources, “compensation shall be payable under the provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.” The term “employee” excludes “a master or member of a crew of any vessel.”

A platform worker and a crew member on the supply boat can therefore sit under different statutes, and as with dock work the Act allows an action against a negligent vessel (33 U.S.C. § 905(c)).

What if the injury happened on land, at a plant or terminal?

Then Texas law usually governs. Texas workers’ compensation is generally elective for private employers. For a covered employee it is the exclusive remedy; an employee of an employer without coverage may sue for negligence under rules that limit the employer’s defenses.

Under Labor Code § 406.002, an employer is allowed to “elect to obtain workers’ compensation insurance coverage,” except public employers and as the law otherwise provides. For an employee the employer has covered, § 408.001(a) makes those benefits the only remedy against the employer for a work injury, with one exception: § 408.001(b) permits exemplary damages for the surviving spouse or heirs of an employee killed by the employer’s intentional act or omission or gross negligence. When the employer carries no coverage, § 406.033 takes away three defenses (the worker’s contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and a fellow employee’s negligence), though the worker must still prove the employer’s negligence. Our articles on work-related car accidents, when workers’ compensation is not enough and non-subscriber claims and deadlines go further, and our workplace accidents page covers other job injuries. If a worker died, see the wrongful death page and who may claim after a deadly crash.

Being next to the water does not decide the question. A plant on the channel that does not load, unload, repair or build vessels may fall outside § 903(a)’s adjoining-area language, while a terminal that does may fall inside it.

How do the job sites compare?

Match the place of injury and the worker’s role to the statute. The table below gives the usual starting point for each kind of Houston job site, though the real answer always turns on the facts of the case.

Which law a court is usually asked to apply, by job site
Where the injury happened Worker Law usually asked about Key provision
Aboard a vessel in navigation (tug, barge, supply boat) Crew member whose duties serve the vessel Jones Act negligence action against the employer 46 U.S.C. § 30104(a); Chandris two-part test
Pier, wharf, dry dock or terminal area used for loading, unloading, repairing or building vessels Longshore worker, ship repairer, harbor worker Longshore Act compensation; possible negligence action against the vessel 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903(a), 905(b)
Fixed platform or other installation on the Outer Continental Shelf Platform worker who is not a crew member Longshore Act compensation through OCSLA; adjacent state law fills gaps 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a), (b); 33 U.S.C. § 905(c)
Plant, refinery or warehouse away from vessel work Land-based employee Texas workers’ compensation, or negligence suit against a non-subscriber Labor Code §§ 406.002, 406.033, 408.001

Provisions read on 16 October 2026 at Cornell Law School’s U.S. Code pages and the Texas Legislature’s Labor Code.

Which agencies investigate a job-site accident?

OSHA regulates working conditions at marine terminals and, in some cases, on vessels; the Coast Guard regulates inspected vessels. An agency citation is a safety enforcement action, not an injury claim, and cannot replace one.

OSHA’s marine terminal rules are at 29 C.F.R. § 1917.1, which applies to “employment within a marine terminal,” including loading, unloading and handling cargo. On vessels, the Supreme Court addressed the line in Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling (2002), a case involving an uninspected drilling barge: the Coast Guard had “neither affirmatively regulated the working conditions at issue, nor asserted comprehensive regulatory jurisdiction over working conditions on uninspected vessels,” so OSHA’s jurisdiction was not displaced. It described “inspected” vessels as subject to comprehensive Coast Guard regulation.

A recent Ship Channel example shows how OSHA enters the picture. After a December 2025 sulfuric acid release at BWC Terminals in Channelview, ABC13 reported in June 2026 that OSHA proposed more than $3.5 million in fines against three companies, including two cleanup contractors, over training and respirator problems; BWC said it intends to appeal. The penalties are proposed, not final, and a citation does not decide who pays an injured worker’s medical bills; a worker hurt that way might also read about compensation after a brain injury.

Why does the Houston Ship Channel mix so many job sites?

Because one waterway holds public terminals and industrial plants along its length. Port Houston, the public port authority, runs eight facilities of its own along the 52-mile channel, which is dredged to hold a 46-foot depth.

Its port overview counts a large breakbulk facility and two container terminals among them, named on its site as Bayport and Barbours Cut. A port post of 29 August 2024 dates the channel’s federal and local partnership to 1914. A terminal worker may fall under the Longshore Act, a ship’s crew member may be a seaman, and a worker at an industrial site like the Channelview terminal above may fall under Texas law.

What deadlines apply to each kind of claim?

Each regime has its own clock. Written notice of a Longshore Act injury is due within 30 days and a claim within one year; a federal maritime tort action generally within three years; and Texas workers’ compensation uses 30 days for notice to the employer and one year for the claim.

Notice and filing periods by regime
Regime Notice Filing
Longshore Act Within 30 days, to the deputy commissioner and the employer (33 U.S.C. § 912(a)) Within one year (33 U.S.C. § 913(a))
Federal maritime tort action None stated in the statute Three years after the cause of action arose, “except as otherwise provided by law” (46 U.S.C. § 30106)
Texas workers’ compensation Within 30 days, to the employer (Labor Code § 409.001(a)) Within one year, with the Division of Workers’ Compensation (Labor Code § 409.003)

Each statute has exceptions, and the Longshore Act’s filing time does not start until the employee is, or should be, aware of the injury’s link to the employment (§ 913(a)). Confirm your deadline with an attorney promptly. See also how long a Texas injury case takes and comparative negligence in Texas.

What should an injured worker do first?

Get medical care, report the injury to your employer in writing, keep a copy, and note where you were and what you were doing. Then talk with an attorney ahead of any recorded statement or anything you are asked to sign, because the regime that applies sets your deadlines.

Record the vessel, dock, platform or plant, the date and time, who saw it, and which supervisor you told. The facts that decide your status, such as how often you work aboard a vessel, are also the ones an employer may use to argue that another statute applies; bring the documents a case evaluation needs. Our note on attorney-client privilege covers what you tell a lawyer.

Our cost guide and questions to ask a lawyer help you compare firms, and why witnesses matter applies to a job-site injury too. Other claim types are on the personal injury lawyers page and in the frequently asked questions, and the contact page takes a description of the injury. For a plain-language start on negligence, see the tort law primer. If a road crash was part of how you were hurt, the checklist after a crash, the car accident lawyers page and which photographs to take apply as well.

Frequently asked questions

What is maritime law?

Here, it means the federal statutes and court decisions on injuries tied to vessels and navigable waters, including the Jones Act, the Longshore Act and general maritime tort principles. Which applies turns on the worker’s status and the place of injury.

When does maritime law apply to an injury at work?

The Jones Act is for seamen, workers tied substantially to a vessel in navigation. The Longshore Act applies to workers in maritime employment hurt on navigable waters or on an adjoining pier, wharf, terminal or similar area used for vessel work. Other workers fall under state law.

Who enforces maritime law?

Different bodies enforce different parts. OSHA enforces safety standards at marine terminals and, after Mallard Bay, on some vessels; the Coast Guard regulates inspected vessels; and Longshore Act claims go to a deputy commissioner (33 U.S.C. § 913(a)).

Can a worker get both Jones Act and Longshore Act benefits?

Generally not for the same injury. The Supreme Court has described the two as “mutually exclusive compensation regimes,” because the Longshore Act excludes a master or member of a crew of any vessel from its coverage (Chandris v. Latsis, 1995). Workers who fall under neither may have state workers’ compensation or maritime tort claims.

Can a longshore worker sue the employer for negligence?

Generally not: 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) makes the Act’s compensation the employer’s only liability, unless the employer failed to secure payment, when the worker may choose to claim compensation or sue. A claim against a negligent vessel under § 905(b) is separate.

Is a Houston refinery or chemical plant worker covered by the Jones Act?

Not merely because the site is on the Ship Channel. The Jones Act protects seamen, and Chandris separates them from land-based employees who happen to work near vessels. A plant worker is ordinarily under Texas workers’ compensation or a non-subscriber negligence claim.

About the authors

Sam A. Maida, Jr., Owner and Managing Attorney at Maida Law Firm

Owner and Managing Attorney

Sam A. Maida, Jr. has represented injured Texans in the greater Houston area since the firm opened in 1993.

Texas Bar No. 00787950

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Bernard G. Johnson III, Litigation Managing Attorney at Maida Law Firm

Litigation Managing Attorney

Bernard G. Johnson III is a board certified trial lawyer licensed in Texas since 1996 and a graduate of South Texas College of Law.

Texas Bar No. 00796832
Admitted to practice in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas (2004)

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